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Some Remarks on Modelling from a  
Computer Science Perspective 
Günther Görz ∗ 
Abstract: »Einige Bemerkungen zur Modellierung aus der Sicht der Informatik«. 
One of the basic tasks of computer science is to rewrite models derived from 
other scientific disciplines so that they can be represented and processed on 
computers. If such a reconstruction process is only partially successful or fails 
entirely, the modification of the initial model becomes an interdisciplinary re-
search task. The modelling task is to be seen as an application of knowledge 
representation and processing. We distinguish between aiming at models of 
something or models for some purpose. Modelling of given domains starts with 
the construction of a formal ontology. To support issues such as modularity and 
interoperability, in particular in a web-based environment, the idea of refer-
ence ontologies came up. For object-based research in the humanities, the 
Conceptual Reference Model (CRM) by ICOM/CIDOC is such a reference ontolo-
gy which has become an ISO standard. 
Keywords: Modelling, computer science, ontologies. 
1.  Methodological Preliminaries 
My general assessment of modelling results from a general view on the human-
ities and the sciences, which appear in two forms: a propositional (“textbook”, 
theory) form and a research form. The latter is a form of (methodological) 
action. Based on experience from interdisciplinary research, we can observe 
that problem orientation replaces disciplinary constrictions, which can lead to a 
reconstitution of the unity of science – i.e. of scientific rationality rather than 
systems. This unity, transcending disciplinary borders, can be seen as a unity of 
language, where in both cases we have similar procedures of verification and 
justification (giving reasons), which constitute meaning. That is a practical 
(pragmatic) unity, including the distinction between the context of discovery 
and the context of justification. So, it is essential for modelling to provide a 
linguistic framework for conceptual modelling and justification. That will 
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comprise the identification of common generic concepts and relations / proper-
ties from an event, process or action perspective, respectively. 
2.  Computer Science and the Concept of Model 
One of the basic tasks of computer science is to rewrite models derived from 
other scientific disciplines so that they can be represented and processed on 
computers. More specifically, this means that given models have to be trans-
formed into versions for which effective procedures can be given. A key appli-
cation area of reconstructed models is simulation (see Wedekind et al. 1998). If 
an initial model cannot be translated directly into the language of computer 
science, a reconstruction step is required. In the humanities in particular, under-
standing and explanation of actions in terms of reasons and intentionality pro-
vide challenges to operationalized representations.  
If such a reconstruction process is only partially successful or fails com-
pletely, the modification of the initial model becomes an interdisciplinary re-
search task. Key issues for success include making the disciplinary terminology 
more precise, modifying the modelling approach, and extending the range of 
computer science methods. This offers opportunities not only to refine existing 
knowledge, but also to develop new epistemological interests (“Erkenntnis-
interessen”) in the respective disciplines as well as in computer science. That is 
the basic meaning of computational science and computational humanities, 
whereby it is essential that both parties speak a common language. 
When studying the creation of models and its methodological and technical 
foundations, the precise introduction of metalevel terms such as model and 
simulation becomes indispensable. In computer science we find two elaborate 
uses of the term model, one derived from mathematics and physics, the other 
influenced by empirical applications in natural and social sciences and in engi-
neering. 
In mathematics and theoretical computer science, the concept of model is 
used only in the context of structuring theoretic approaches. Such structural 
models sensu stricto exist only in logic and mathematics. The idea is often 
applied to physics, but there the axiom systems contain not only schematic, but 
also interpreted parts from the very beginning. The second understanding of 
model deriving from application areas means a certain way of describing em-
pirical processes, mostly within a naive realistic epistemic framework. Talking 
about modelling some external reality is in fact dealing with discipline specific 
experimentation and observation contexts, i.e., about descriptions of relevant 
states of affairs. The claim that a model simplifies some part of reality does in 
fact refer to the simplification in such descriptions – linguistic means can only 
be applied to linguistic objects.  
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The level of detail of the initial description is determined by the research 
program (Lakatos) of the respective theory in which context the model is to be 
created. Such a research program provides the language of the description, the 
description standards, and the explanatory schemata. Last but not least the 
expectations which precede the construction of a model are formulated within 
this framework. Hence, modelling is an activity that has two aspects: A model 
must satisfy the empirical descriptions, but also the theoretical specifications. 
For model construction, comprehensive descriptions of states of affairs as they 
result from observations, etc., run through certain modifications, so called 
idealizations: values are being smoothed, different expressions of a feature are 
replaced by mean values, and certain influences are regarded as negligible. 
These modifications aim to achieve relatively simple and clear representations 
of empirical states of affairs as well as adaptability to pertinent theoretical 
structures. The result of such an idealization is called a descriptive idealized 
model. If it is a structural model of a theory at the same time, then the hypo-
thetical assertive claim (“Geltungsanspruch”) is regarded as confirmed and the 
state of affairs is seen as described, or explained, by the theory. In engineering 
the theoretical structure is often complemented by technical (functional) stand-
ards–this is the case of technical idealized models such as construction plans 
and schedules. 
Simulation models are special descriptive models of technical or natural sys-
tems, which are confined to certain material restrictions. A system in general is 
given by a set of elements, which are bound together by certain relations and 
are separated by clear boundaries from its environment. A system is a technical 
system if its external effects as well as its internal relations are determined by 
objective functions (“Zielfunktionen”). The abstraction steps involved in the 
construction of a simulation model do not aim at the generation of a class of 
cases (as in the descriptive idealized model), but at the generation of a class of 
variations of a base case. 
3. Modelling, Knowledge Representation, and Formal 
Ontologies 
Computer science has a special role in the construction of idealized or simula-
tion models: First, it has to organize the initial descriptions of the models in 
such a way that the required modelling steps can be carried out, and the de-
scriptions and models have to be transformed into an appropriate representa-
tion. This comprises determining how objects can be represented by features or 
feature groups in general, which relations can be set up among them and how 
certain feature values are assigned meanings such that these can be processed 
as data; i.e. the design of data structures and processing rules. 
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In more detail, this means that the modelling task is to be seen as an applica-
tion of knowledge representation and processing, which in my view consists of 
a purpose-driven formal reconstruction of a body of knowledge and its imple-
mentation in a (logical) language. Initially we can already distinguish whether 
our theoretical enterprise aims at models of something or models for some 
purpose(s). Hence, the construction of a knowledge base (“knowledge engi-
neering”) requires at least the determination and delimitation of the domain of 
discourse, a determination of the relevant concepts and properties (“what?” as 
opposed to “how?”), where properties are represented by relations (“has-”), and 
a hierarchical ordering of concepts and properties (“is-a”). This simple frame-
work already allows for the representation of particular objects (individuals) as 
instances of concepts. Of course, in most cases there are many desirable exten-
sions to what can be expressed such as constraints restricting properties in 
various ways, or the specification of properties of properties. To express further 
relationships between concepts and between particulars, rules (“axioms”) are 
often introduced. Although it sounds trivial that implicit knowledge cannot be 
processed algorithmically, ontology construction is a good exercise to enforce 
the development of methods for the explicit representation of implicit 
knowledge. To summarize: modelling of a given domain starts with the con-
struction of a formal ontology, which in turn can serve as the basis for the 
construction of a theory, often in the form of a critical reconstruction (see Görz 
2016). 
At this point, a short remark about semantics seems appropriate: The logical 
framework provides the structural part, and the meaning of content words (con-
cepts) is given by a network of relations even if we include controlled vocabu-
laries; but in an empirical setting reference must be provided by external 
grounding. Nevertheless, semantics is meant to refer to the logical framework, 
i.e., an inference relation. Reasoning should be performed by sound and com-
plete inference rules as in, e.g., Description Logic. How to deal with vagueness 
and imprecision in such a framework is still a research question. Another chal-
lenge is to take account of conflicting information, such as diverging ascrip-
tions of dates or places or authorship. And, of course, deductive reasoning is 
only one side of the coin, and must be complemented by an ars inventoria, i.e. 
heuristic procedures, as Leibniz has already stated (1679/1999). 
With formal ontologies, several issues arise such as modularity and interop-
erability, in particular in a web-based environment. Therefore, the idea of ref-
erence ontologies, which contain generic concepts and properties relevant for 
many applications, came up. Specifically for object-based research in the hu-
manities, the Conceptual Reference Model (CRM) by ICOM/CIDOC is such 
reference ontology, which is now an ISO standard. Its characteristic feature is 
that it is event-based and easily extensible: a series of extensions for geograph-
ic data, archaeology, and scientific observations have been suggested as well as 
many domain-specific ontologies, e.g. from the museum, library (FRBR) and 
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archive domain, fostering the development of standardized components and 
libraries. Methodologically, the CRM allows for a chronotopological modelling 
of data. With CRM as a common reference a high level of interoperability can 
be achieved.  
With the CRM, semi-formal representations are also possible as it allows the 
inclusion of (uninterpreted) text in its representations, which are in principle 
open for semantic disclosure at a later point in time. Our implementation in 
OWL-DL (Görz et al. 2008) allows us to deploy CRM-based ontologies to the 
Semantic Web and to publish Linked (Open) Data. Because OWL is a very 
expressive Description Logic, powerful reasoning engines are available. There-
fore, such models can serve as explanation models, as opposed to pure func-
tional models which result from existing popular and successful machine learn-
ing algorithms. To support cooperative research and communication, in 
particular for object documentation and object-based knowledge generation and 
processing, so-called Virtual Research Environments (VREs) have been devel-
oped. WissKI (Görz 2011; Scholz and Görz 2012; Scholz, Merz and Görz 
2016) is such a VRE with special support for data acquisition in the mentioned 
event-base style through its ontology-based modelling component. Actually it 
has more than 20 applications in the field of cultural heritage, mostly in muse-
um documentation, but also in providing semantic frameworks for epigraphy 
(Scholz et al. 2014) and the history of cartography (Görz and Scholz 2013). 
To conclude with a remark on simulation: Logic-based models can serve for 
discrete (qualitative) simulation in a rather immediate fashion using the reason-
er. From a theoretical perspective, there is an immediate connection via proofs 
as programs (Curry-Howard correspondence). The domain of continuous simu-
lation models (System Dynamics, etc., as used in social sciences) is beyond the 
scope of this presentation. 
4.  Discussion 
In the discussion with my opponent Francesca Tomasi, clarification questions 
have been raised which I hope to have answered by rewriting some formula-
tions present in the text of the presentation. I had the impression that our posi-
tions are quite similar. However, I would like to take up some questions that 
remain. First, Francesca questioned my emphasis on justification. To me it 
seems clear that giving reasons is fundamental to scientific discourse from the 
perspective of the philosophy of science, and this includes the humanities.  
The conditions and rules of argumentation may be different, but justification 
is essential for knowledge, as opposed to pure opinion. She then asked why 
understanding and explanation of actions in terms of reasons and intentions are 
a challenge for operationalized representations.  
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Besides a few clarification questions which I hope to have answered by re-
writing some formulations in the text of the presentation. I had the impression 
that our positions are quite similar. The following questions by Francesca re-
main: 
Francesca Tomasi’s questions 
1) Why do you emphasize justification? 
Answer: Giving reasons is fundamental for scientific discourse from the 
perspective of the philosophy of science, and this includes the humani-
ties. The conditions and rules of argumentation may be different, but jus-
tification is essential for knowledge, as opposed to pure opinion. 
2) Why is understanding and explanation of actions in terms of reasons and 
intentions a challenge for operationalized representations? 
Answer: The question is whether and, if so, how intention can be opera-
tionalized. Of course, this depends on our definition of intention. Alt-
hough there is a highly controversial philosophical discussion about in-
tentionality, I cannot see any viable method to formalize intention 
completely in line with physical terms. So we need some way to deal 
with it on the computational level: that’s the challenge. 
3) Is a model not an explanation? 
Answer: Yes, in a sense. I would prefer to say that an operational model 
such as a deductive or simulation model can provide explanations. 
4) Do you think that the construction of the theory is next to the construc-
tion of the ontology? 
Answer: Yes, at least insofar as a formal ontology is a necessary condi-
tion for the construction of a theory in the strict – not postmodern – 
sense. The ontology defines the concepts, at least. 
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